In the political tradition of Morocco, the idea of “national pact” evokes the alliance concluded between monarchy and the party from Istiqlal (nationalist right-hand side) since 1943, after the conference of Anfa (1), to work with the dismantling of protectorate on this country, each partner keeping his autonomy and acting according to its own means. The shortly after independence, acquired on March 3, 1956, the pact was called into question by those which, within the national Movement (regrouping of the parties having fought for independence), believed easy - like what had occurred in Egypt, in Iraq, in Tunisia or in Yemen - to put at the variation monarchy, and to control under the authority of a single party being based on the urban middle class. Monarchy retorted by directly taking again the control of the government as of May 1960 and, after the death of Mohamed V in 1961, passed an alliance with the notable rural ones which ensured the success of the constitutional referendum of December 1962 and the legislative elections (more discussed) of April 1963. The new monarch, Hassan II, granted also an increasing place in the government to an army which was essential like guarantor of the new balance, repressing the urban riots (in particular that of Casablanca, in March 1965), decapitating the left (removal and assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka in November 1965) and allowing the reference of the Parliament sine die as of July 1965. The system will find its limits in the military plots of 1971 (rising armed and attempted murder of the king with Skhirat) and 1972 (attacks air against the plane of the king), which will make run to monarchy a risk of disappearance. Since then, Hassan II sought the means of operating a durable recombining of the political system which would make it leave a certain insulation all while leaving him the free hands. After the legislative elections of November 1997, can one imagine that designation, on February 4, 1998, of social democrat a Prime Minister, Mr. Abderahmane Youssoufi, the head of a government of coalition of center-left, will have made it possible to the king to carry out his wishes? It is not the first nine months assessment of the government which allows to conclude definitively. But the operation of the political system seems rather largely changed by a permanent step of adjustment and search for consensus. Monarchy is not able any more all to impose and the withdrawal, always possible, of the Prime Minister appears, as well on the interior level as on the external level, like a failure full of consequences for the sovereign. On the other hand, the continuation of the experiment calms waitings and makes hope for a consolidation of the transition leading to true democratic choices. It is only when the various partners alleviate their fears that elections at the risk will be acceptable in practice. The mechanism in progress is the result of a long advance derapports of complementarity and confrontations between the monarchy and the opposition of left whose origin is in the dialogue which is established, the shortly after the military plots (1971-1972), between the king Hassan II and the Socialist Abderrahim Bouabid, then chief of the national Union of the popular forces (UNFP) (2). It also joins again, in a certain way, with the method followed by Mohamed V at the following day of independence. Since the legislative elections of 1993, Hassan II considered a renewal of the Cabinets making reach the opposition to the responsibilities without that depriving it for all that of its freedom decision. At the price of a great tenacity and some concessions, the current scenario is likely to succeed. The outlined compromise is unstable. It however draws an evolutionary field of forces which maintains monarchy as central actor of the political system. The continuation of the events will depend on the skill of the partners, the international situation and the domestic equilibria. In the parties as at the top of the State, a generation come to the public life at the following day from independence must pass the hand. A restoration of Makhzen The elections of November 1997 caused to allow the renewal of the elites in the parties traditionally related to Makhzen (3) as in those which, while belonging to the opposition, are negotiating their ausystème incorporation. The constitution of a government of opening, directed by Mr. Abderrahmane Youssoufi, secretary general of the socialist Union of the popular forces (USFP), can appear in this direction like a successful operation of restoration of Makhzen. As well in the parties related to the crown as in those of the opposition, the choice of the elites is done by co-optation with mechanisms of filtering which must more with the networks made up than with ideological positionings. There are no more clear differentiations between the unit of the parties having vocation to exert governmental responsibilities, from the conservatives to the left and the islamist moderate ones. The recovery of criticisms of the left on the increasing inequalities social is now guaranteed by the king, which made it possible Mr. Youssoufi to build his speech of nomination by articulating it on a whole of quotations of Hassan II whole while remaining faithful to its program. The evocation of the social fracture belongs to the current ideas, but also of a reality perceived by all. Morocco counts 60% of illiterates and is located at the 125e row of the countries classified according to their index of human development by the United Nations in 1998. It is located largely behind Algeria and Tunisia, and even after Egypt and Syria, if one bases oneself on basic indicators concerning the school, the supply of care or the interior product gross (GDP) per capita. At the same time, the social inequalities are more strongly felt, including in the pattern of the settlement in urban space. The number and the visibility of the new rich person make perceptible a difference between the extremes, which escapes control from the State. The fear of the urban revolts settles in background of the behaviors without that managing to motivate the persons in charge in favour of a policy of reduction of the inequalities. The response of the government was, initially, symbolic system: reduction of the government's rate of expenditure and sale of the vehicles of the Fields to the civils servant. Its effect remains limited on a country where the basic problems cannot find solution political. For a long time, the threat came rather from a marginalized rural world. Today, fear moves towards the peripheral districts of the large metropolises, which are far from reaching dimension that the phenomenon knows in Cairo or Algiers. Misery does not have anything again and the shantytowns are perhaps wider but, as a whole, less poor wretches that those of the Sixties. The recent factor having a political significance comes owing to the fact that the middle class, like the leaders, fears to see rocking of broad sides of this population of the shantytowns in the radical Islamism, which seems the only form of credible opposition, in particular after incorporation from the left (socialist and communist) to the block from the capacity. Algeria is useful, certainly, of driving bolt and creates the implicit conditions of the consensus. Many sees in the need for avoiding the contagion of the Algerian example at all costs the justification of the maintenance of the authority of Makhzen and for not showing themselves too much looking vis-a-vis its methods of narrow framing, which put the citizen in permanent contact with “authorities” which control its everyday life. From there, the protest against electoral “interventionism”, after the legislative ones of November 1997, took on a secondary aspect because it seemed a simple technique of regulation aiming at preventing the constitution of an islamist coalition. Electoral strategy of the Minister of Interior Department, Mr. Driss Basri (right-hand man of the king and strong man of the country, which preserves its wallet in the government of Mr. Youssoufi), consisted in gathering the political actors on a dated February 28, 1997 Joint Declaration (4). The preceding government was committed being been opposing to any illegal intervention administration. The political parties, on their side, began to respect the same provisions adopted by the government. In testimony of this compromise, a national commission and regional commissions, in charge of the follow-up of the elections, were created to regulate the disputes by amicable agreement. If these commissions could play a part, they hardly chipped the prerogatives of the Minister of Interior Department. Those could be exerted, without particular control, for the cutting of the districts or the mode of poll. The choices carried out aimed at limiting the advantage acquired at the time of the communal elections for the party of Istiqlal or, in certain cases, by the parties of the center. It was enough then to a marginal action to support the USFP, the islamist moderate ones or the democratic and social Movement (MDS) of Mr. Mohamed Aarchane so that no clear majority emerges. Arrival at the head with legislative of November 1997, the opposition, with first party the USFP, seems more divided than ever on the choices to be operated, including inside each formation. No majority of government emerged in an autonomous way and the Palate naturally had to be requested to make the arbitrations necessary to the work of the institutions. Under these conditions, the protests against the fraud were not convincing and did not involve the risk of withdrawal of the play as in 1993. The direct interventions of the administration were perhaps less important than in the past. But the traffic of electoral charts and the purchase of votes could be done on a great scale. Financial means the most important was, seems it, between the hands of the new administrative party (MDS). The irregularities profited with all the parties. Two outgoing elected officials belonging to the USFP recognized that the real results were in favour of islamist candidates. To integrate moderate Islamism The strategy of the Palate had like objective to allow a fluid political play and to support the subjected personalities, whatever lespartis. The poll of November 14 thus confirmed the parcelling out of the political scene (5). The USFP was found in dominant position within Koutla. But its rallying with the government of coalition could not be done without reducing important internal tensions and agreeing to leave a vast block of competences under the direct responsibility of the Palate (6). Within the opposition one sees emerging the MDS of Mr. Aarchane, representing a kind of investment populist supported by Mr. Driss Basri to constitute the pivot of a solution of replacement if the coalition led by the USFP would not be viable. This Makhzen party collected as many seats as Istiqlal, which seemed the principal one losing consultation. But its stable electorate, his framing and his legitimacy keep a capacity of negotiation to him which it used at the time of the constitution of the government insofar as Mr. Youssoufi held with his participation (7). One could think, before the elections, that Istiqlal had a role important to play like rampart against Islamism. The price to be paid in terms of maintenance of the autonomy of Makhzen was undoubtedly too high and monarchy seems to have chosen on the contrary the way of the integration of a moderate Islamism which could be done only at the expense of Istiqlal and by diverting a substantial share of this electorate of the influence of the sheik Yassin, charismatic chief of Moroccan political Islamism. Islamism thus appears, in an original way, like a major element of the current recombining of the political scene. Its real audience is undoubtedly broader than the public expression which in was tolerated insofar as it can be pressed on a current at the same time protester and nonviolent, who remains for the moment apart from the play. It recruits largely in the average cities and the districts of the large cities where the first generations of rural concentrate urbanized. In a traditional way, this movement knew to answer by caritative actions of proximity the situation of social dereliction in which these populations are. The university campuses also constitute one of the strong points of its establishment. The situation of current alternation constitutes, for the islamist ones, a means of dialogue with Makhzen and with the elites in place to be introduced into the system very continuously to profit from one will have political honesty. They take care not to fall into the trap from violence, as in the close countries. One does not see them therefore joining in the short run the governmental coalitions. They could however be brought to play the part of intermediaries in the event of urban riots, and the capacity would not have certainly any more the free hands to as in the past repress them in silence. In the event of crisis of succession (8), the islamist ones would be certainly speakers symbolic systems of a weight equal to that of the oulemas, the sheik Yassin finding a determining role if necessary. The political dialogue that monarchy launched could not from now on exclude them - and one could even see them occupying some of the places, or the roles, reserved in the past for an official Islam which misses today singularly gloss. One can also imagine their intervention at the sides of monarchy on great national causes like the business of the Western Sahara. But the capacity takes care not to let constitute a coalition which would bring together the young graduates without employment, the ideologists producing a speech on Islamic modernity and the new currents of the liberal middle-class. The unit which can constitute a credible solution of replacement in the event of difficulties of the current coalition. Divisions inside the islamist current make not very credible this assumption in the immediate future. Hassan II can thus allow himself to integrate, in a marginal way, some moderate elements of this current to the political play. The report/ratio of force plays in its favour and competition with the other parties remains constant. The price to pay risk however to be visible on an Islamization scale certain of the company, which will be felt including in the speech of the left, and more still in Istiqlal. It would be the counterpart of the “makhzenisation” of the islamist ones. Medium-term, the designation of Mr. Youssoufi to the head of the government thus seems a manner, for monarchy, to legitimate in a modern way its domination and to renew themselves by the co-optation of the elites of left and an opening towards the islamist moderate ones. The risk is systematically controlled. More subtly, the choice made by Hassan II at the end them the Eighties deliberately direct its country in the way of a bringing together with Europe (including in 1987 with a request for provocative adhesion at the European Community) determines the opening towards the opposition of left, symbol of modernity and guarantee of a program of structural adjustment which takes again on its account the recommendations of the World Bank. In the long term, with the customs union, the inevitable reopening of the borders, the current favorable to a real democratic projection should be reinforced, including by the reduction of the field of the underground economy which largely feeds the circuits of corruption. One can think that it is a step wanted by Hassan II without he being for as much ready to give up immediately all the extent of his personal capacity. In a paradoxical way, one can also formulate the assumption that the opening controlled towards the islamist moderate ones constitutes a rebalancing with the co-optation of the opposition of left by Makhzen and with the orientation of the country in the way of one long-term bringing together with Europe. Revival of the military threat BY allowing a greater Islamization of the company, the capacity causes a preventive identity response with regard to those which would wish to be useful of these choices to show an aggressive individualism. Islamization can thus seem an antidote managed by electoral way with the democratization and the risks of a too great influence of the external models. It can, for better or for worse, be also used to influence the plebiscitary referendums which, since 1962, melt the monarchical capacity on a popular basis. After the plots of the beginning of the Seventies and green Walk (1975), the legitimacy of the mode comes to be restored by a constitutional referendum (1996) and the implementation of the new political pact with the opposition. The evolution presents is at the result of a long route of unequal dialogue where the only weapon the opponents had was the withdrawal, denying by-there same its legitimacy with the mode. The play becomes more complicated to extremely be able it because of existence of an islamist current, revival of the internal military threat related to the end of the conflict of the Western Sahara and emergence of new educated elites which affirm their autonomy in the economic field. One could see reappearing the electoral risk at the time of a referendum on the Sahara, which must take place in theory before the end of 1998 if the agreement of Houston is respected. It would be the same in the event of monarchical succession if the referendum then acts as beya of a new kind. It would be difficult to practise a broad handling of the results, as that had been the case in the past. On the other hand, the mechanism should be used for integration of islamist in the political play. A measured management of the electoral risks and choice of the elites at the local and national level will intervene only if monarchy gives up the direct exercise of the capacity at the time of a change of reign. The fold of the future sovereign on a strong symbolic system role would result in then organizing a real competition between those which would accept the guiding principles of the constitutional monarchical system. The first nine months of government of social democrat unpremier minister leading a coalition of alternation wanted by monarchy are worth more for the implementation of the method followed and the opening on the future that for the width of the results. The constitution of the government lasted more than one month, during which Mr. Youssoufi negotiated with patience and skill the participation of Istiqlal and the contour of the ministries of sovereignty depending on the Palate. The made concessions on this side were less difficult than those which the chief of government had to grant to the parties of his coalition or the currents of his own party. Hassan II let operate Mr. Youssoufi while preserving a vigilant attention at the details. The two partners built, including in the management of the reports/ratios symbolic systems, a personal relation without intermediaries, which takes the continuation, in another context, of that which existed between Mr. Abderrahim Bouabid and Hassan II. The concessions of the sovereign were often less visible than those of the Prime Minister, insofar as it were necessary to observe the forms and where the weapon with a blow available to Mr. Youssoufi (his departure) would be, for both, an acknowledgement of failure full of consequences for the country. While waiting, the team is difficult to handle and the arbitrations express more continuity than the change. The room for manoeuvre remains narrow and its management supposes a trustful co-operation of the two capacities. Waitings of those which hoped for a reduction of the inequalities, work (the young graduates without employment continue to express in front of the ministries) or a better operation of the administration attacking the corruption remain sharp. The trade unions remain hostile with what could seem an easing of the protection of employment. The budget made some concessions with the welfare expenditures, in particular as regards education. But there is no possible projection in these fields without touching with the budget of defense. The exit of the conflict of the Western Sahara should allow the reduction of manpower of an army of 200.000 men, which goes, because of the agreement of Houston, duty to fold up itself in north during the time which precedes leréférendum. The debate on the Algerian nuclear power opened by the revelations of the Spanish daily newspaper El Pais, last August, will influence the role and the composition of the Moroccan military system. One sees the Maghreb badly launching out in a climbing of the India-Pakistan type. But the absence of reactions of Morocco would be incredible as much. Technical adjustments to give the means of having other forms of response (chemical weapons) are plausible. All that belonged to the reserved field of the king, but it is not very conceivable that the Prime Minister misses reflexion on the Western Sahara, the future of the army or the relations with Algeria. It has an international credit which constitutes an asset for Morocco. And will in any event be questioned on these questions by its international partners when he wants to renegotiate the foreign debt, as at the time of his visit in France, at at the beginning of October. Mr. Youssoufi there too has a capital of confidence which it would be a shame to waste because of the dysfunctions of Makhzen. The association of the sovereign and the Prime Minister can give to the country a greater capacity to consider the great interior stakes and outsides to which the country must face. That supposes, on behalf of the government, the recognition of the legitimacy and the know-how of monarchy to manage these businesses. Seen under this angle, the transition is not a balanced negotiation. It notes the inequality of the partners, to start with a government which proceeds of skewed elections. To be able to influence the decisions of the sovereign, the Prime Minister cannot destroy the illusion unanimist. It is only at this price that it can recover a margin of internal criticism. The ideological abandonments are immediately perceptible whereas the margin of influence of the government is based in the company of modernization of Makhzen which will perhaps lead on a rationalization of the operation of the State and to a true democratization. Towards a new national pact WHILE waiting, the government of Mr. Youssoufi manages the ambiguous heritage which he discovers, having to take into account the men in place charged to limit its ambitions. It wants to give an image legalist and reformist all while not having the means of a true policy of reforms. The need for finding an exit with the financial crisis, the need to cross in a coherent way the stage of the monarchical succession, the end of the conflict of the Sahara and the concern of not beginning with Algeria in a climbing of recourse to the weapons of massive destruction are problems requiring the conclusion of a new national pact. For the ones, it is about a simple renewal of the elites by co-optation without compromising the royal domination. For others, more trustful, the current stage goes beyond the direction that its principal actors, Hassan II and Mr. Youssoufi, give him temporarily: it is about a social democrat project of democratic transition which must also be used for refonder monarchy. Europe is selected as principal partner with the hope which it will be able to better include/understand and support the Moroccan experiment that it did not show of opening into 1989-1990 with the projects of the Algerian reformers of the Hamrouche. government Beyond waitings as regards debt, Europe could make efforts agriculture movement of the people. It would thus give the feeling which it can exceed a sedentary approach (drugs, migrations, terrorism) of the Maghreb to take into account the questions of long-term development and stability of the companies. If the Moroccan experiment were led to the failure, either by awkwardnesses of his principal actors, or by the incomprehension of his external partners, one could envisage his replacement only by one authoritative and populist experiment. Soldiers and islamist would then have chances to find like adversaries (or accomplices) system of substitution which would be set up. The force of the king Hassan II is to have known - thanks to the examples of the Algerian disorder and the Spanish democratic transition - to persuade its partners who monarchy was the least bad of the solutions. It is not very probable that its successor will have the means of maintaining ambiguity with his profit also a long time by preserving the reality of the capacity. Will Europe be able on its side to deal with the problems of the Maghreb with the essential attention that this dangerous file deserves? Rémy Leveau. High Morocco of the form dates prone the Netherlands from the form Retrouvez other analyses, in our cédérom. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) In June 1943, in Anfa, residential district of Casablanca, the president of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, British the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the Moroccan sovereign Mohamed V (like his son, the future Hassan II) declared the system colonial out-of-date and expressed the wish to see Morocco, once the finished war, to reach independence. (2) To see Abderrahim Bouabid, journalist in the combat of independence, Foundation A. Bouabid for sciences and the culture, Folds back, 1981. (3) This term indicates the police headquarters successively controlled initially by the sultan, then by the king. Historically, Makhzen also meant the territory managed by the monarch in opposition to the village siba, territory insubordinate escaping the police headquarters. (4) To see Zakya Daoud and Brahim Ouchelh, “Morocco ready for alternation”, diplomatic Le Monde, June 1997. (5) The legislative elections of November 14, 1997 confirmed the political crumbling of Morocco. Arrived at the head, the Socialists of the socialist Union of the popular forces (USFP) of Mr. Abderrahmane Youssoufi (74 years), obtain only 18% of the voices. The “democratic block” (Koutla), dominated by the USFP and Istiqlal, has only 102 seats, whereas line, joined together within Wifak, gains 100 of them, and that two other parties of right center - the national Gathering of independent (RNI) and the democratic and social Movement (MDS) - obtain 46 and 32 from them. In addition, islamist moderated constitutional and democratic popular Movement (MPCD) have 9 seats, as much as the Communists of the Party of progress and socialism (PPS). (6) The government of Mr. Youssoufi was made up on March 14, 1998. It is dominated by three parties (USFP, Istiqlal, RNI) of a coalition which counts nine of them (of which Communist PPS), but several wallets (interior, Foreign Affairs, justice, businesses Islamic) are held by personalities named by the king, who preserves, in addition, the high hand on the army and national defense. (7) Istiqlal was seen allotting six wallets, in particular the ministries for the equipment, energy and mines, and the public health. (8) The king Hassan II (70 years) has two wire, Sidi Mohamed and Moulay Rachid; in theory, the elder one and crown prince, Sidi Mohamed, should succeed to him, but in Moroccan political circles, one does not exclude a crisis from succession. In the event of crisis, the role of the religious authorities (which, historically, were associated the successor nomination) would be important. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE | novembre 1998 | Pages 14 et 15 http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/11/LEVEAU/11275Haut du formulaire